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THE NEXT WAVE IN PUBLIC BEACH ACCESS: REMOVAL
OF STATES AS TRUSTEES OF PUBLIC TRUST
PROPERTIES
JAMES M. KEHOE*
The Great Shawnee Chief Tecumseh asked rhetorically, "Sell the
Earth? Why not sell the air, the clouds, the great sea?"'
INTRODUCTION
America's coastal areas have experienced a tremendous increase in
development since the 1960s.2 As a byproduct of this exponential
growth, the public now has less access to the ocean in many coastal
areas.3 Disparities in socioeconomic status play a major role in access
to the nation's resources, especially in access to beaches. When
oceanfront landowners, through continued development, can exclude
the public from gaining access to the coastline, the ocean itself be-
comes private property.
Two diametrically opposed views underlie the different concerns
regarding management of oceanfront property. Proponents of greater
beach access argue that the general public should have rights of access
to and along every beach in the country without regard to whether the
beachfront property is privately or publicly owned. Beachfront home-
* I would like to dedicate this Note to my family and especially to the memory
of Michael Brian Kehoe.
1. See 3. Hughes, American Indian Ecology 63 (1983).
2. See Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-
508(a)(2), § 6202, 104 Stat. 1388-299, 1388-299 (1990) ("Almost one-half of our total
population now lives in coastal areas. By 2010, the coastal population will have grown
from 80,000,000 in 1960 to 127,000,000 people, an increase of approximately 60 per-
cent, and population density in coastal counties will be among the highest in the Na-
tion."); Public Access to the Shore: Hearings Before the Subcomn. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1987) [hereinafter Public Access Hearings] (statement of Hon. Claudine
Schneider, United States Representative from Rhode Island) (stating that 65% of the
United States population lives within 50 miles of the coast and by the year 2000,75%
will live in coastal areas); Alice G. Carmichael, Note, Sunbathers Versus Property
Owners: Public Access to North Carolina Beaches, 64 N.C. L. Rev. 159, 160 n.2 (1985)
(stating that travelers' expenditures in the coastal community of Dare County, N.C.,
increased 2778% between 1970 and 1982); Paul Morison, Note, Staring Down the Bar-
rel of Nollan: Can the Coastal Commission Dodge the Bullet?, 9 Whittier L Rev. 579,
584 (1987) (noting that 85% of California's population lives within 30 miles of the
shore); Michelle A. Ruberto & Kathleen A. Ryan, Note, The Public Trust Doctrine
and Legislative Regulation in Rhode Island- A Legal Framework Providing Greater
Access to Coastal Resources in the Ocean State, 24 Suffolk U. L Rev. 353, 353-54 &
n.1 (1990) (noting that 65% of Rhode Island's population now lives within five miles
of the coastline and that private landowners control over 90% of Narragansett Bay's
350 mile shoreline).
3. Public Access Hearings, supra note 2, at 3 (statement of Hon. Claudine Schnei-
der, United States Representative from Rhode Island).
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owners, in contrast, believe that the public only should be allowed
access to public beaches. Such a view allows these homeowners to
retain expectancy interests of security of title to their property. A ma-
jor problem in the beach access area is that these opposing ideologies
comprise more than mere views; they embrace competing expectancy
interests.4
Both arguments, however, have serious shortcomings. Enforce-
ment of the position that the public should have access to all beaches
from every point along the coast may violate the United States Consti-
tution, which protects persons from deprivations of private property
without due process of law.5 Certain government-authorized depriva-
tions or uses of private property without providing compensation are
known as takings.6
Public access to all oceanfront property irrespective of the landown-
ers' rights would cause an extreme diminution in property values of
privately owned oceanfront land. These decreases in property values
may be substantial enough to effect a taking. Further, it is not neces-
sary for vindication of public interests in these properties to realize
access to all beaches from every vantage point. While private proper-
ties may block some access routes to the coastline, other routes may
still be accessible at nearby locations. On the other hand, the position
that the public should only be able to use public beaches overly re-
stricts public use of the ocean. In many areas, public beaches are few
4. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 847 (1987) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
5. U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause was never
technically incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. John E. Nowak & Ronald
D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 10.2, at 335 (4th ed. 1991). The Supreme Court,
however, determined that the Fourteenth Amendment provides the same protections
for citizens against deprivations by the states. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
6. The definition of what constitutes a taking is as confused as the law regarding
the public trust doctrine. According to the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2895 (1992), a taking exists when, by appropriation
or over-regulation, "the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his
property economically idle." There are several other ways to define a taking. See, e.g.,
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1981) ("[A] per-
manent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to
the public interests that it may serve."); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266
(1946) (finding that airplane flights over landowner's property effected a taking be-
cause "they [were] so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interfer-
ence with the enjoyment and use of the land"). When a taking exists, the property
owner must be compensated for her loss. No compensation is owed, however, if the
state can show that the nature of the estate is such that the proscribed use was not
initially part of the "owner's" title. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899; see D. Benjamin Barros,
Note, Defining "Property" in the Just Compensation Clause, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1853,
1864-65 (1995); infra part I1.B and note 169.
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and far between 7 and reasonable public access is not provided, espe-
cially to those that lack transportation.
The increased privatization of, and diminished access to, coastal
properties has generated a great deal of litigation over the past twenty
years.' This increased litigation has led to legislative action by many
states and the federal government. A few states, using different ap-
proaches, have responded favorably to a public desire to gain access
to the ocean. For example, Hawaiian legislation "guarantees" access
to the state's coastline by providing for the acquisition of land to cre-
ate public access routes.' Texas has accomplished greater beach ac-
cess through the Texas Open Beaches Act,'1 which encourages courts
to find public easements by imposing prima facie presumptions of pre-
scriptive public rights in beach properties." New Jersey has increased
beach access judicially through the seminal case of Matthews v. Bay
Head Improvement Ass'n.' In Matthews, the New Jersey Supreme
7. A major problem in the United States in terms of beach access is the rapidly
increasing population and the tendency toward higher population density at the coast-
line. See supra note 2; infra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
8. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825; Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 578 (Ct. App. 1985); Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355
(NJ.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of
Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (NJ. 1972).
9. Hawaiian law states:
The legislature finds that miles of shorelines, waters, and inland recreational
areas ... are inaccessible to the public due to the absence of public rights-of-
way ... [and] that the population of the islands is increasing while the pres-
ently accessible beach, shoreline, and inland recreational areas remain fixed;
and that the absence of public access to Hawaii's shorelines and inland rec-
reational areas constitutes an infringement upon the fundamental right of
free movement in public space and access to and use of coastal and inland
recreational areas. The purpose of this chapter is to guarantee the right of
public access to the sea, shorelines, and inland recreational areas, and transit
along the shorelines, and to provide for the acquisition of land for the
purchase and maintenance of public rights-of-way and public transit
corridors.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 115-1 (1985).
10. Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. §§ 61.001-.026 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1995). Be-
cause of the Texas Open Beaches Act, approximately 77% of the Gulf shores are
available for public use. Public Access Hearings, supra note 2, at 14 (statement of
Garry Mauro, Commissioner of the General Land Office, State of Texas).
11. Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 61.020 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1995). The Texas
approach to increased access is illustrated by the case of Moody v. White, 593 S.W.2d
372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). In Moody, a landowner built a motel on land alleged to be
public property by way of prescriptive easement. Id. at 374. The court stated:
The public's use of the beach for many years was so open, visible and notori-
ous that the appellants must have recognized the people's right to the beach.
For many years in excess of the 10 year statutory period, the general public
used the beach as their own: hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, sunning,
and effecting many more uses.
Id at 377-78. The amount of public access to the Texas coastline supports the propo-
sition that the prescriptive easement approach works well in a supportive jurisdiction.
12. 471 A.2d 355 (NJ.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
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Court determined that the public must have "reasonable access to the
foreshore13 as well as a suitable area for recreation on the dry sand."14
In contrast, other states, including Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, and Virginia, have adopted very strict guidelines
concerning the concept of public ownership of coastal properties, re-jecting expansive public rights in the coastline. 15 Generally, the mean
high tide line is the line of demarcation between private and state
ownership. 6 Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
Virginia have historically used the low water mark as the line of de-
marcation, a line more favorable to private landowners.17
The federal government has also enacted legislation to address the
problem of diminishing beach access. The Coastal Zone Management
Act of 1972 ("CZMA")' 8 provides funding for states to develop
coastal management programs, including strategies to acquire access
routes to the ocean. Due to its lack of both substantive guidance and
innovation, however, the CZMA has not ameliorated the problems
associated with diminishing beach access.19
It is well settled that each state holds certain properties in trust for
the public and that these obligations may not be discharged.20 This
concept of the state as trustee of property for the benefit of the public
13. The foreshore is the wet sand area between the mean low tide line and the
mean high tide line. Lord Hale, De Jure Maris (1787), reprinted in Stuart A. Moore, A
History of the Foreshore 370, 378 (3d ed. 1888).
14. Matthews, 471 A.2d at 366. The test for reasonableness is "whether those
means [such as proximity and availability of public beaches and streets to the wet
sands] are reasonably satisfactory so that the public's right to use the beachfront can
be satisfied." Id. at 365.
15. See William Goldfarb, Water Law 121 (2d ed. 1988). For example, of Maine's
3800 total coastal miles, only approximately 20 miles are publicly owned. Public Ac-
cess Hearings, supra note 2, at 17-18 (statement of James E. Tierney, Attorney Gen-
eral of the State of Maine).
Of Massachusetts' 1500 miles of coastline, only about 300 miles are available for
public use. Id. at 9 (statement of Stephen Bliven, Assistant Director of the Coastal
Zone Management Program for Massachusetts). Further, only about 50% of those
300 miles are easily accessible; the other 50% are either islands or inaccessible with-
out four wheel drive vehicles. Id. These data are even more incredible considering
that 75% of the Massachusetts population lives within a half hour of the shore. Id.
16. See Goldfarb, supra note 15, at 121. The public trust traditionally encom-
passed up to the mean high tide line, so the Matthews court extended it to encompass
an area for recreation. Unfortunately, New Jersey municipalities are presently utiliz-
ing many forms of subterfuge to eliminate beach access that has been endorsed by the
state courts. See Joseph F. Sullivan, Dispute on Access to Beach in New Jersey Goes to
Court, N.Y. Times, April 4, 1989, at B2; see also Jack H. Archer et al., The Public
Trust Doctrine and the Management of America's Coasts 107-08 (1994) (noting that
New Jersey municipalities have attempted to limit access to beaches by "subtle
means," including "restricting access to public toilets").
17. See Goldfarb, supra note 15, at 121.
18. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
19. See infra notes 249-63 and accompanying text.
20. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); see also infra notes 80-86
and accompanying text (discussing Illinois Central).
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is known as the public trust doctrine. The public trust is an ancient
doctrine providing for public rights in certain properties, including the
ocean. 1 In essence, the public trust doctrine assumes that the state
owns legal title to certain properties, while the use of the properties is
reserved to the public. Unfortunately, while states agree that the
ocean and coastline, at least to the mean low tide line,21 are held for
the public benefit, the states do not allow for reasonable access to
these properties, thereby rendering the designation of these properties
as part of the public trust meaningless.
This Note argues that the public trust doctrine is the best solution to
the problem of diminishing public access to the ocean. Part I reviews
the legal foundations of the public trust doctrine in both Roman and
English law. Part II focuses on the public trust as an American legal
concept and analyzes the myriad legal contexts into which the doc-
trine has been classified, including modem trust principles. Part II
addresses the consequences of classifying the public trust as a princi-
ple of modem trust law and, most importantly, examines the possibil-
ity of removal of states as trustees of public trust properties. Part IV
examines federal legislation and proposes that a federal statute be
passed setting minimum standards for state compliance with public
trust access rights to the nation's beaches. This Note concludes that
the public trust doctrine is the best way to deal effectively with the
problem of diminishing public beach access, allowing for the removal
of states as trustees of trust properties under certain circumstances.
States will act more prudently with respect to public trust properties if
federal legislation of the type proposed in this Note is effectuated.
I. ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine has Roman and English common law ante-
cedents.3 The development of the doctrine, both statutorily and judi-
cially, provides insights into how the doctrine may be construed today.
21. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894). Many states have adopted the
public trust doctrine and/or public rights in waters in their state constitutions. See
Alaska Const. art. VIII, § 14; Cal. ConsL art. X, § 4 (amended 1974); Fla. Const. art.
X, § 11; Haw. Const. art. XI, § 1; Idaho Const. art. XV, § 1; Mont. Const. art. IX, § 3;
N.C. Const. art. XIV, § 5; Pa. Const. art. I, § 27 (amended 1971); R.I. Const. art. I,
§ 17; Va. Const. art. XI, § 3; Wis. Const. art. IX § 1.
Other states have recognized the public trust doctrine and/or public rights to waters
statutorily. See Ala. Code § 33-7-1 (1991); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 271"20 (1987 &
Supp. 1994); N.Y. Pub. Lands Law § 75 (McKinney 1993); N.D. Cent. Code Ann.
§ 61-01-01 (1985 & Supp. 1993); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 390.610 (1987); S.D. Codified
Laws § 43-17-1 to -2 (1983 & Supp. 1994).
22. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
23. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in





The earliest known expression of the public trust doctrine was ad-
vanced in the works of Justinian, a primary source of Roman law,
codified approximately 1500 years ago. 4 The Romans, in creating
their laws, borrowed heavily from the Greeks,25 who were very depen-
dent on the resources of the sea.26 According to Justinian, natural
law27 provided for communal rights in basic natural resources, includ-
ing the sea and the seashores.28 Roman law declared:
No one therefore is forbidden access to the seashore, provided he
abstains from injury to houses, monuments, and buildings generally;
for these are not, like the sea itself, subject to the law of the na-
tions.... But [the seashores] cannot be said to belong to any one as
private property, but rather are subject to the same law as the sea
itself, with the soil or sand which lies beneath it.
2 9
These "laws of nature," established by "divine providence," were to
remain "fixed and immutable. '30
Roman law established different classifications of property inter-
ests, two of which are important for the purposes of this Note. First,
the res nullius were common properties without owners, subject to the
24. J. Inst. 2.1.1. The Romans codified statutory and jurisprudential law in the
Corpus Juris Civilis, promulgated by the Emperor Justinian. The Corpus Juris Civilis
contained four main parts: Institutes, Digest, Code, and Novels. For the purposes of
this Note,.only the Institutes and Digest are relevant. For a further detailed discus-
sion concerning the Corpus Juris Civilis, see U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Public
Trust Rights 1-9 (1978).
While the public trust concept has been in existence since Roman times, public
rights with regard to water resources existed well before the birth of Christ. See
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 Envtl. L. 425, 429-30 (1989).
Some researchers, however, believe that the modem public trust doctrine is solely
an American legal invention. See Richard C. Ausness, Water Rights, the Public Trust
Doctrine, and the Protection of Instream Uses, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. 407, 411 (1986)
(arguing that the public trust doctrine "is largely an American creation"); Glenn J.
MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical De-
velopmen Current Importance, and Some Doctrines that Don't Hold Water, 3 Fla. St.
U. L. Rev. 511, 589-91 (1975) (arguing that the public trust doctrine did not exist
under the English common law).
25. Wolfgang Kunkel, An Introduction to Roman Legal & Constitutional History
24, 99 (2d ed. 1973).
26. William Drayton, Jr., Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Sub-
merged Legal Doctrine, 79 Yale L.. 762, 763 (1970).
27. Natural law is "the law of nature or of God." 52A C.J.S. Law § 1 (1968). The
term was "intended to denote a system of rules and principles for the guidance of
human conduct which... might be discovered by the rational intelligence of man, and
would be found to grow out of and conform to his nature, meaning by that word his
whole mental, moral, and physical constitution." Black's Law Dictionary 1026 (6th ed.
1990).
28. J. Inst. 2.1.1-1.6.
29. l at 2.1.1.
30. Id at 1.2.11.
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use and benefit of the public.31 The actual property of the seashore
was considered res nullius32 and was, therefore, subject to public use.
Regarding the use and benefit, however, the seashores were consid-
ered res communes, or common properties.33 The res communes were
properties belonging to the state or to private individuals, but subject
to perpetual use by the public.' While the seashores were not subject
to state ownership,35 they were under state supervision or jurisdiction
to ensure free public use. 36 Roman law provided remedies for private
infringement of the public's rights of free use of the coastline, includ-
ing damages and injunctions.37 Thus, the properties were held by the
government in trust for the public use. This theme of government
holding property for the public use underlies the modem public trust
doctrine.
B. English Law
Public rights to the coastline and the ocean differed dramatically
before and after the adoption of the Magna Charta. The Magna
Charta was adopted in 1215 for the primary purpose of making the
King of England subject to the law.38 English law regarding the public
trust doctrine can be readily bifurcated: pre-Magna Charta and post-
Magna Charta.
1. Pre-Magna Charta
English common law39 required that almost all land have an
owner,40 otherwise incidents from the owner could not be collected by
31. Joseph K. Angell, A Treatise on the Right of Property in Tide Waters 17
(1826). But see Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine" An Economic Perspective,
29 Cal. W. L. Rev. 239, 250 (1992) (noting that some researchers believe that "the
Justinian idea of communal rights to shorelines was aspirational rather than
descriptive").
32. Angell, supra note 31, at 16-17. The notion of res nullius is at odds with the
English common law, which required that all property have an owner. Id. at 17.
Under English common law, if lands were incapable of ownership by an individual, it
was considered as owned by the Crown. Id
33. I
34. Dig. 1.8.6.pr. (Marcianus, Institutes 3); 1.8.10 (Pomponius (extracts from Plau-
tis 6)).
35. Dig. 41.1.14.pr. (Neratius, Parchments, Book V).
36. Dig. 43.8.3.pr. (Celsus, Digest, Book XXXIX); 39.2.24.pr. (Ulpianus, On the
Edict, Book LXXXI). For the practical purposes of the public, there was no differ-
ence between the res communes and the res nullius because they were both subject to
common use.
37. William A. Hunter, Roman Law 165 (1876).
38. loyd E. Moore, The Jury: Tool of Kings, Palladium of Liberty 48 (2d ed.
1988).
39. English common law came largely from the Romans. Angell, supra note 31, at
15. This English reliance on Roman ideas brought the concept of the public trust to
England. See Lazarus, supra note 23, at 635.
40. Lord Hale, Sir Matthew Hale's First Treatise (1786), in Stuart A. Moore, A
History of the Foreshore ch. 14, at 357-61 (3d ed. 1888); see also Jan S. Stevens, The
195] 1919
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the King, thereby reducing revenue to the Crown. To provide for
public use of certain properties, most importantly for fishing and navi-
gation, land was owned by the King, but held for the common use of
all.
4 1
In the years preceding the charter, during the Middle Ages, public
rights in the seashore evaporated.4' This decline in public rights was
the result of the Crown's jurisdictional and sovereignty claims to tidal
areas being mistaken for private ownership. 3 Due to this confusion,
the King claimed the private right to the coastline and its vast re-
sources.44 Once claimed as privately owned in fee 45 the King be-
lieved them to be freely alienable and conveyed the lands to private
owners.46 Thus, local feudal lords took control of ocean resources.47
Although in violation of English common law, the King and local
lords continued to convey these properties, and the Roman ideas of
common ownership dwindled in English law.48  By the time the
Magna Charta was issued in 1215, almost the entire English ocean-
front was owned by private individuals.49
During this period, the economy depended heavily on the ocean,
and without the availability of the ocean and its resources, the coun-
try's socioeconomic situation faltered. Societal upheaval and unrest
prompted the Magna Charta, which, in conjunction with judicial inter-
Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's Environmental
Right, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 195, 201 (1980) (suggesting that the English and Ameri-
can legal scholars who classified the public trust as a true trust did so because of this
need to find an owner of the legal title to common properties).
41. Angell, supra note 31, at 17.
42. Ruberto, supra note 2, at 363-64.
43. See Stuart A. Moore, A History of the Foreshore 1-168 (3d ed. 1888); Frank E.
Maloney & Richard C. Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean High
Water Line in Coastal Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C. L. Rev. 185, 198 (1974); Drayton,
supra note 26, at 764-65.
44. Moore, supra note 43, at 182 (discussing Digges' Queen's Prerogative and In-
terest in Land left or gained from the Sea and Arms thereof, with Answers to Every
Objection, in Moore, supra note 43, at 185-211); Drayton, supra note 26, at 765.
45. The term "fee" refers to a fee simple absolute, which is "an estate limited
absolutely to a person and his or her heirs and assigns forever without limitation or
condition." Black's Law Dictionary 615 (6th ed. 1990). The holder of a fee simple
absolute has an "unconditional power of disposition." Id.
46. Drayton, supra note 26, at 765.
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. Moore, supra note 43, at 24, 28, 639-40.
50. See Ruberto, supra note 2, at 365 ("Citizens in the stifled commercial society
protested the king's infringement on personal property rights and demanded naviga-
tion rights."); see also Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from its
Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 185, 189-90 (1980) (stating that peasants
revolted because of the decrease in availability of resources); Leonard R. Jaffee, Note,
State Citizen Rights Respecting Greatwater Resource Allocation: From Rome to New
Jersey, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 571, 582 (1971) (noting that citizens demanded increased
water rights as England became "a commercial entity").
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The Magna Charta marked the revival of the Roman concept of
communal ownership in coastal properties.5 At the time the Magna
Charta was ratified, the navigation of rivers by English citizens had
become a very difficult task due to the proliferation of weir S53 owned
by the King.54 These weirs became such a nuisance by obstructing
navigational passage and public fishing that a provision of the Magna
Charta ordered the King to remove all of them. 5
The main purpose of the Magna Charta was to restrict the King's
power by pronouncing that the sovereign was subject to the citizens.
It did not, however, "expressly recognize public rights in coastal re-
sources." 56 Thus, although the Magna Charta is considered a defining
moment in public rights to the coastline, the judges who interpreted
the document are the true champions of public water rights.5 As it
51. Drayton, supra note 26, at 765.
52. Id. at 765-66.
53. Weirs are fishing structures permanently affixed to the bottom of the body of
water.
54. Drayton, supra note 26, at 766.
55. Magna Charta, ch. 33 (1215).
56. Ruberto, supra note 2, at 365.
57. The common law went to extreme lengths in providing public rights in tidal
properties, far beyond those enunciated in the Magna Charta. See Drayton, supra
note 26, at 765-68. After noting that the Magna Charta began a trend toward protect-
ing the public interest, Drayton states:
The steps taken in [the time of the Magna Charta], however, were insignifi-
cant when compared with those which have since been attributed to it.
Every grain of public interest protection to be found in the Magna Charta
was subsequently seized upon and developed to illogical and unhistorical
lengths by a legal system struggling to adapt the law of the foreshore to new
and more demanding economic and political conditions. In the process of
developing ('interpreting') the terms of the contract made at Runnymede,
the courts, while never abandoning the original Roman conception of a gen-
eral common ownership in all the people, began to speak in terms of particu-
lar guaranteed rights. The resulting doctrinal ambiguity continues to this
day, although the emphasis on particular public rights or easements has be-
come dominant.
Id. at 765-66. But see Arnold v. Mundy, 6 NJ.L. 1 (1821). In Arnold, Chief Justice
Kirkpatrick declared of the Magna Charta:
I am of opinion, that this great principle of the common law was, in ancient
times, in England gradually encroached upon and broken down; that the
powerful barons, in some instances, appropriated to themselves these com-
mon rights; that the KINGS themselves, also, in some instances during the
same period, granted them out to their courtiers and favourites; and that
these seizures and these royal favours are the ground of all the several fish-
eries in England, now claimed either by prescription or by grant; that the
great charter, as it is commonly called, which was nothing but a restoration
of common right, though it did not annul, but confirmed, what had been thus
tortiously done, yet restored again the principles of the common law, in this
1995] 1921
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developed, the common law tremendously expanded the public rights
recognized in the Magna Charta, and the King's legal rights with re-
spect to fishery and navigation became limited to those he exercised
as protector of the public good. The King no longer had the right to
grant oceanfront properties to feudal lords irrespective of public rights
m the use of such properties. The King's role shifted from pirate of
public rights to protector of public rights.58
Joseph Angell, a prominent legal scholar of the early 1800s, wrote
that the "property of the sea and tide waters" were held by the
Crown.59 But the waters were public and free for navigational and
fishing purposes "indiscriminately and without interruption. ' 60 An-
gell further noted that the shore was "of common right public....
The maxim [was] ... [that] the king ha[d] the property, but the people
ha[d] the necessary use."' Approximately one half century after the
ratification of the Magna Charta, the English legal scholar Henry de
Bracton wrote:
By natural law these are common to all: running water, air, the sea,
and the shores of the sea, as though accessories of the sea. No one
therefore is forbidden access to the seashore, provided he keeps
away from houses and buildings [built there], for by the jus gentium
shores are not common to all in the sense that the sea is, but build-
ings built there, whether in the sea or on the shore, belong by the
jus gentium to those who build them. Thus in this case, the soil
cedes to the building, though elsewhere the contrary is true, the
building cedes to the soil.62
as well as in many other respects; and since that time no king of England has
had the power of granting away these common rights, and thereby despoil-
ing the subject of the enjoyment of them.
Id. at 77. Arnold was subsequently overruled by Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441, 457-58
(1850), aff'd, 23 NJ.L. 624 (1852). The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, has
recently reinstated the decision of Arnold in Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of
Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 51-55 (NJ. 1972).
58. As Joseph Angell noted:
[I]t cannot be construed that the king has any other legal tenure in the rights
of fishery and navigation than belong to him in the character of protector of
public and common rights. And hence it is that the king has no authority
either to grant the exclusive liberty of fishing in any arm of the sea, or to do
anything which will obstruct its navigation. The king, it is true, may grant
the soil of any arm of the sea... but the right of the grantee so derived is
always subservient to the public rights before mentioned.
Angell, supra note 31, at 33-34 (citation omitted); see also John M. Gould, A Treatise
on the Law of Waters 42 (2d ed. 1891) ("[Tidal properties are] burdened with a trust
or charge in favor of the public.").
59. Angell, supra note 31, at 19.
60. Id. Angell went on to note that the "indiscriminate" public right was subject
to an exception for "royal fish" (whales and sturgeon), which the King owned because
of his "guardianship of the seas, and of his protection thereof against pirates." Id.
61. Id. at 20 (citation omitted); see also Gould, supra note 58, at 42 ("The king has
the property, but the people have likewise the use necessary.").
62. 2 Henry de Bracton, On the Laws and Customs of England 39-40 (Samuel E.
Thorne trans., 1968) (footnotes omitted). Bracton's obvious reliance on Justinian's
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Judging from Angell's and Bracton's accounts, the judiciary's expan-
sive construction of the Magna Charta brought English common law
full circle by the early 1800s. In fact, Bracton's explication indicates
that the Crown's interest in these properties after the Magna Charta
was significantly similar to Justinian's concepts.
The Crown's interest in these properties was two-fold. First, the
Crown had the jus publicum, the right of control and jurisdiction for
the public benefit.63 Second, the Crown had the jus privalum, the
right of private property." The jus privatum was subject to the jus
publicum and could not be used by the Crown in a manner antithetical
to the rights of the public.' Furthermore, while the land determined
to be jus publicum could be conveyed to private owners, it could never
be discharged of public rights.66
With this doctrinal development came pressure from individuals in-
terested in public rights to broaden the reach of the public trust, ide-
ally to where it encompassed even more than it did at Roman law.67
These proponents advocated adoption of the easement approach,
which limited private owners' rights by reserving easement rights in
the public. 68 The advocates of this approach believed it to be the way
that Roman law provided for public use of these properties. This
translation of Roman law was skewed, however, because the Romans
did not believe in private ownership of public trust lands; rather, they
believed in communal rights.69 But, as one researcher declared:
This theoretical difference [between the adoption of the easement
approach and the actual Roman ideas of communal ownership]...
has prevented neither coexistence nor confusion of identity. The
Digest is readily apparent. Compare text accompanying note 61 with text accompany-
ing note 29. Bracton's declaration uses almost the exact language of Justinian's
Digest.
At least one researcher, however, disagrees with Bracton's assertion:
Bracton must have been well aware that throughout the kingdom the fore-
shore in the point of property was in very numerous places vested in the
lords of manors, although subject to the jus publicum. It has ... been clearly
decided that many of the passages which Bracton took from the Civil Law
are inconsistent with, and form no part of, the English Common Law.
Moore, supra note 43, at 33.
63. Gould, supra note 58, at 35-36 (citing Lord Hale, De Jure Maris, ch. 6 (1787)).
64. Id. at 36-37.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Drayton, supra note 26, at 769.
68. Id. An easement is "[a] right of use over the property of another." Black's
Law Dictionary 509 (6th ed. 1990). There were several practical reasons for the Eng-
lish to follow the easement theory. One major advantage was that the Crown could
alleviate unnecessary expense in maintaining these properties, while still allowing for
public use. Paradoxically, this theory allowed for a return to the Roman idea of com-
munal ownership. When easement rights became sufficiently enlarged, the concept of
private ownership in public trust lands would be all but decimated. Drayton, supra
note 26, at 769-71.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 27-36.
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Courts have never forsaken the theory of ancestral Roman law, and
the Roman approach recently has been gaining ground in prac-
tice.... [T]he broader principles of the Roman model can only
lend support to a claimed easement under the public trust theory.
Despite this confusion, the public trust doctrine was fully revived in
English common law. Therefore, the English essentially adopted the
idea of the public trust doctrine from the Romans. The King held the
title to the property, but the public had rights to the use of the
property.
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DocrRINE AS AN AMERICAN LEGAL
PRINCIPLE
With the adoption of the English common law by the American col-
onies, the public trust doctrine was embedded in American law.71
Throughout its history, the public trust doctrine has been ignored, at-
tacked, and, finally, vindicated.
A. Background
British settlers brought the concept of the public trust to America
when they claimed ownership by the right of discovery. 72 Upon Brit-
ish settlement of the colonies, public trust rights were transferred to
the colonies by royal charters.73 As early as 1810, American courts
recognized the concept of the public trust doctrine.74 The Supreme
Court first enunciated the doctrine in Martin v. Waddell.75 The Martin
Court determined that after the American Revolution, the people be-
came sovereign, thereby inheriting all rights in navigable waters and
connected soils previously held by the Crown. 6 These rights, of
course, did not include those surrendered by the Constitution to the
70. Drayton, supra note 26, at 769.
71. See Archer, supra note 16, at 6.
72. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14 (1894). The Supreme Court held that when
acquiring a new territory, the United States took title and dominion of the tidal wa-
ters and land below the high water mark for the public benefit and in trust for the
future states to be created from the territory. The Court also stated that the newly
admitted states possessed the same rights in trust properties as the original states. Id.
at 26.
73. Catherine R. Hall, Dockominiums: In Conflict with the Public Trust Doctrine,
24 Suffolk L. Rev. 331, 336 (1990). "[Flee to these lands passed to the state [from the
Crown], which held them in trust for the inhabitants of [the state]." Id. at 339.
74. See Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 474, 494 (Pa. 1810). The Pennsylvania court in
Carson declared that "the right to fisheries in the said river is vested in the state, and
open to all." Id. The case of Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821), however, is generally
regarded as the first case in the United States in which a court discusses the public
trust concept. The Arnold court stated that "where the tide ebbs and flows... are
common to all the people." Id. at 12.
75. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
76. Id at 410.
1924 [Vol. 63
PUBLIC BEACH ACCESS
federal government.' The properties that were transferred to the
states included the properties that were impressed with the public
trust. Because the Crown held legal title to these properties subject to
the public's use,78 when the states took control of these properties,
they also took subject to the public use rights.79
In the landmark public trust case, Illinois Central Railroad v. Illi-
nois,80 the United States Supreme Court stated that public trust
"'lands were held by the State, as they were by the King, in tnst for
the public uses.' "81 In Illinois Central, Illinois had granted a large
part of Chicago's waterfront on Lake Michigan, a navigable lake, to
private owners.'n The Illinois Attorney General filed suit on behalf of
the citizens of Illinois against the private owners and the City of Chi-
cago to obtain a judicial decision as to the rightful ownership of the
property.8 3 The Supreme Court, in no uncertain terms, declared that
the public trust doctrine imposes affirmative obligations upon states as
trustees:
77. Id- The rights that the states surrendered to the federal government in the
Constitution are embodied in Article I, § 10. These rights include the right to coin
money, the right to pass ex post facto laws, and the right to keep troops without con-
gressional consent. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 59-66.
79. As the law and common sense both dictate, a trustee or any other transferor
cannot convey greater title than she possesses. Williams v. Thrasher, 62 F2d 944, 946
(5th Cir.), cerL denied, 289 U.S. 748 (1933); McNeil v. Tenth Nat'l Bank, 46 N.Y. 325,
329 (1871); 90 CJ.S. Trusts § 306 (1955); cf. Hessen v. Iowa Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 190
N.W. 150, 152 (Iowa 1922) (stating that one cannot transfer greater interest in chattel
than one possesses).
Of course, the process described in the text only accounts for the original 13 states.
With respect to the western lands that the United States subsequently acquired, the
United States was the owner when the western states came into being. But the
Supreme Court has reasoned that, on the basis of the "equal footing doctrine," new
states take property of the United States in the same way as the original states. See
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894) ("The new States admitted into the Union
since the adoption of the Constitution have the same rights as the original States in
the tide waters, and in the lands below the high water mark, within their respective
jurisdictions."). The subsequent states succeeded to the same rights based on the the-
ory that the properties acquired by the United States from the original 13 colonies or
from foreign nations were held in trust for the new states so that they might be admit-
ted on equal footing with the original states. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212,
221 (1845). As to lands in territorial status, the Federal government exercised sover-
eignty. Shively, 152 U.S. at 48-50. Thus, western states also took title subject to duties
owed to the public through the public trust.
80. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
81. Id. at 457 (quoting Stockton v. Baltimore & N.Y. R.R., 32 F. 9, 19 (C.C.D.NJ.
1887)). Illinois Central has been followed and cited extensively in modern case law.
See Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 203 (1987); Lake Mich.
Fed'n v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 742 F. Supp. 441, 444 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
Thus, these rights exist today in much the same way as they did in England after the
Magna Charta.
82. 146 U.S. at 438.
83. Id. at 433.
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A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a State has
never been adjudged to be within the legislative power; and any at-
tempted grant of the kind would be held, if not absolutely void on
its face, as subject to revocation. The State can no more abdicate its
trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like nav-
igable waters and the soils under them, so as to leave them entirely
under the use and control of private parties, except in the instance
of parcels mentioned for the improvement of the navigation and use
of the waters, or when parcels can be disposed of without impair-
ment of the public interest in what remains, than it can abdicate its
police powers in the administration of government and the preserva-
tion of the peace.84
Thus, Illinois Central left no doubt that the public trust doctrine is
valid under federal law and is binding on each of the states. The
Court emphatically declared that a state may not abandon its public
trust obligations by attempting to convey trust properties.8 5 The
Court concluded that, because of the state's duty imposed by the pub-
lic trust, the attempted alienation was revocable by an interested
party.8 6
B. The Takings Doctrine and Public Trust Decisions
There was very little development of the public trust doctrine in
America until the late twentieth century. Since the 1970s, the public
trust doctrine frequently has been employed to vindicate public rights
in private lands.' These public interests must be construed narrowly
to avoid constitutional violations of private property, such as tak-
ings.' Takings originally referred only to physical appropriation by
government of private property.8 9 In modem times, however, takings
are found in many circumstances where there is no physical appropri-
ation.' A taking may be found when governmental action (federal or
state) results in significant impairment of the use and enjoyment of
the property. 91 Therefore, an overly comprehensive regulation, even
though it does not require physical acquisition of the property, may
84. Id at 453 (emphasis added).
85. Id at 453.
86. Id at 453-55.
87. Prior to the 1970s, the public trust doctrine was conspicuously overlooked. See
Sullivan, supra note 16, at B2.
The increased use of the doctrine since the 1970s is in large part due to Professor
Joseph L. Sax and his seminal article, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970). Utilizing his ideas,
the public found a new way to voice concerns regarding dwindling access to natural
resources. Professor Sax, a Professor of Law at Boalt Hall School of Law, University
of California at Berkeley, is widely regarded as the foremost legal scholar on the
public trust.
88. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
89. Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 5, § 11.12(a), at 427.
90. Id.
91. Id at 427, 441.
1926 [Vol. 63
PUBLIC BEACH ACCESS
effect a taking. 2 Paradoxically, in some situations, an extensive regu-
lation may be found not to be a taking because it does not require a
physical appropriation.93 Evidence of a physical acquisition, there-
fore, causes the judiciary to favor a takings finding; there is almost
always a declaration of a taking when a governmental action allows
physical acquisition of property or permits people, other than the
owner of the property, to occupy the property permanently. 4
Government can only take and use private property for the public
benefit if it is justified by emergency or if the government pays just
compensation. 9 Of course, the government does not have the right to
take private property for any reason merely by paying compensation;
the government must show that the action is for the purpose of bene-
fitting the health, safety, and welfare of the public.9p
Thus, while a state's removal of the privilege of a landowner to ex-
clude others from her property may effect a taking,97 this is not always
the case.98 Courts will consider the degree to which the action ad-
vances legitimate public concerns. Other relevant inquiries include
the amount of diminution in property value of the land and the extent
to which the action interferes with the owner's reasonable expectancy
interests with regard to the use of the property.99 This Note urges the
federal government to enact legislation that would provide for more
access routes to the ocean.1'0 Avoiding the takings doctrine is an in-
expensive way to provide for increased rights of access to beaches,
because when there is a taking, compensation must be paid. Although
it is an inexpensive way to provide access, it is not the only way.
Therefore, while a judicial finding of a taking may occur when a right
of access is recognized across private property, it is not fatal to the
proposals in this Note.10' Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to
demonstrate methods to avoid the takings problem altogether, be-
cause of the economic benefits of doing so.
92. Id at 429.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 431; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 438 (1982) (finding a taking where state law required landlord to permit a cable
television company to install a cable box and wiring to her building). But see Yee v.
City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1534 (1992) (holding that no taking occurred
where state law gave tenants the right to occupy their mobile home lots indefinitely at
a fixed price).
95. Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 5, § 11.12(b), at 435-36.
96. Id. § 11.13, at 445.
97. Id. § 11.12(b), at 437.
98. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 79, 82-85 (1980)
(upholding state court decision that no taking existed where the state court prohibited
private shopping center owners from excluding individuals exercising their rights of
nondisruptive speech by petitioning at the shopping center).
99. Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 5, § 11.12(b), at 437.
100. See infra part IV.
101. See infra text accompanying note 297.
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There are several ways to get around the takings problem with ref-
erence to the public trust. First, establishing a pre-existing public trust
right to property effectively precludes a private owner from claiming
that the land was "taken" and thus that the owner is entitled to com-
pensation. When there are pre-existing public rights in the property,
the "owner" of the land cannot reasonably expect to have the power
to exclude the public. The public has a pre-existing right in connec-
tion with public trust properties because the states, upon taking title
to the properties from the Crown, took only the estate that the Crown
had to give.'" Recall that the Crown's ownership was subject to the
public's use; therefore, the state's ownership is also subject to the pub-
lic's use.
In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,103 the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that there are no constitutional limitations on the states'
enforcement of pre-existing public trust rights." 4 In Phillips, the state
of Mississippi issued oil and gas leases on land underlying bayous and
streams that were affected by the tide.'0 5 Petitioners, the record title-
holders of the land underlying these waters,10 6 brought suit to quiet
title after Mississippi issued the leases.' 7 The Supreme Court held
that the public trust doctrine applied to waters influenced by the tide,
whether navigable or non-navigable, 08 and that the property was
rightfully leased by the state.'0 9
Justice O'Connor noted that "[a]lthough Mississippi collected taxes
on the land and made no mention of its claim for over 150 years, the
Mississippi Supreme Court held that Mississippi was not estopped
from dispossessing petitioners."" 0 Therefore, even though petitioners
were record titleholders, presumably bona fide purchasers for value,
and paid taxes on the property, they could not divest the state of own-
ership because, under Mississippi law, ownership of public trust prop-
erty cannot be claimed by a private entity through adverse possession
or any other equitable doctrine."' Thus, states are afforded wide dis-
102. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
103. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
104. Id. at 483. Thus, if the conclusion is reached that the states took title to the
properties subject to public trust rights, there is no takings issue to be resolved. See
supra notes 6, 76-79, and accompanying text; see also infra note 134.
105. 484 U.S. at 472.
106. Id.
107. Id
108. Id. at 472, 484-85.
109. Id. at 484-85.
110. Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
111. Itt at 484 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Many states provide that public trust
properties may not be lost through adverse possession. See, e.g., Miss. Const. art. IV,
§ 104 (stating that the state's public trust properties may not be taken by adverse
possession); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-45.1 (Supp. 1994) (same); see also Lacy v. Montgom-
ery, 124 A.2d 492, 497 (Pa. Super. 1956) (same).
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cretion with respect to at least the traditional uses"'2 of the properties
held in the public trust, but they are prohibited from descending be-
low some undefined minimum federal standard.
Second, there is a well established exception to the takings doctrine
where the exaction "secure[s] an average reciprocity of advantage."'113
The "reciprocity of advantage" test is normally viewed from the per-
spective of a benefit that the person incurring the exaction receives
from the exaction itself." 4 The test, however, seems to be read more
broadly with respect to cases involving large areas of land, such as
zoning.
For example, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, 15 the Supreme Court held that the New York City Landmarks
Preservation Commission's refusal of a landowner's construction
plans did not effect a taking. The Court reasoned that, similar to the
legislation proposed in this Note, the law at issue was not "discrimina-
tory" or a "land use decision which arbitrarily single[d] out a particu-
lar parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring
ones." 116 The Court found that no taking occurred despite the fact
that "zoning laws regulate all properties within given physical commu-
nities whereas landmark laws apply only to selected parcels." 1 7 The
Court further noted that although the landmark law did not "impose
identical or similar restrictions on all structures located in [the] com-
munit[y]"" 8 and that landowners suffer disproportionately, the law
did not effect a taking.119 The landowners' argument that they were
"solely burdened and unbenefitted" was rejected'20 because the law
applied to many structures in New York City and the law "improv[ed]
the quality of life in the city as a whole."''
112. The traditional uses under the public trust were fishing and navigation, but
these uses have been expanded considerably in some states. See Borough of Neptune
City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972) (extending the public
trust uses to "recreational uses, including bathing, swimming and other shore activi-
ties"); infra note 171.
113. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
114. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2328 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that petitioner received a benefit from the exaction); Hodel v.
Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987) (applying the "reciprocity of advantage" test to the
persons incurring the exaction); Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922)
(same).
115. 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
116. Id. at 132; see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,
2924 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that courts have often distinguished cases
involving regulations targeting one or two parcels and regulations that are part of
comprehensive state policies).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 133.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 134-35.
121. Id. at 134.
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Even Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, acknowledged that zoning can-
not be a taking, because "[w]hile zoning at times reduces individual
property values, the burden is shared relatively evenly and it is rea-
sonable to conclude that on the whole an individual who is harmed by
one aspect of the zoning will be benefitted by another.' '1 22
The Penn Central reasoning transcends zoning issues and is readily
applicable to the beach- access arena. As one commentator asserted:
"Each person burdened by a harm-prevention regulation is also recip-
rocally benefitted because similarly situated neighbors are also bur-
dened."''" This statement suggests the interrelation between the
reciprocity exception and the nuisance exception 124 to the Takings
Clause. While the beach access issue probably does not implicate the
nuisance exception, Justice Rehnquist noted that even if the prohib-
ited use is noninjurious, there is no taking "if the prohibition applies
over a broad cross section of land and thereby 'secure[s] an average
reciprocity of advantage.' ,125
Thus, applying the reasoning from Penn Central, the federal legisla-
tion proposed in this Note is not a taking. Although landowners along
the coastline will be burdened by reasonable access exactions, they
also will benefit as beneficiaries of the public trust because they too
will gain by the increased number of access routes to the coast.126
Therefore, the legislation proposed does not implicate the takings
doctrine because exactions will occur "over a broad section of land"-
122. 438 U.S. 104, 147 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
123. Gilbert L. Finnell, Jr., Public Access to Coastal Public Property: Judicial Theo-
ries and the Taking Issue, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 627, 679 (1989). As Justice Holmes stated in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922), "Government hardly could
go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without
paying for every such change in the general law."
124. The nuisance exception states:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are de-
clared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of
the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appro-
priation of property for the public benefit. Such legislation does not disturb
the owner in the control or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor re-
strict his right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its
use by any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public
interests.
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887). A New Jersey court hinted that, in
allowing for greater public rights on dry sand beaches, they were abating a nuisance.
See infra note 180.
125. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
126. See Finnell, supra note 115, at 679; see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,2924 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the act at
issue by claiming that it "does not target particular landowners, but rather regulates
the use of the coastline of the entire state"). The legislation proposed in this Note will
be even more closely analogous to zoning laws than that in Lucas because it will be
part of a national policy of increased beach access.
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namely, the entire American coastline-and will "improve the quality
of life" in the whole country.
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,27 the Supreme Court
held, in a five to four decision,128 that constitutional property protec-
tions outweighed public interests in certain oceanfront property. 129 In
Nollan, the California Coastal Commission 130 attempted to attach
easement rights to development permits for oceanfront property.' 3 '
The Commission was trying to grant a public right to traverse a lateral
pathway 132 on a private beach to achieve greater public access to the
ocean between two public beaches. 133
The Court found no pre-existing legal right in the public to the
property. Thus, the majority determined that the Commission's ac-
tion amounted to a compensable taking.1' The Court held that this
type of forced easement must reasonably be related to the harmful
effects that the development would have in terms of public access
rights. 35 The Court reasoned that if the state wanted to grant this
property to the public, the state would have to compensate the
owner.136 In reaching its holding, the majority ignored not only state
precedent that acquisition of public easements across private beaches
127. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
128. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor joined. Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Stevens, and Blackmun dissented.
129. See 483 U.S. at 841-42.
130. The California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972 created the California
Coastal Zone Conservation Commission. Cal. Pub. Res. Code §§ 27000-27650 (re-
pealed 1977). The California Coastal Act of 1976 replaced the 1972 Act. Cal. Pub.
Res. Code §§ 30000-30950 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993). The new act changed the name
of the agency to the California Coastal Commission. Il § 30105. The Commission
obtained over 52 miles of vertical and lateral coastline access in its first 14 years.
California Coastal Comm'n & California State Coastal Conservancy, Coastal Access
Program Seventh Annual Report 14 (1987).
131. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
132. Lateral access is access along the coastline. The correlative is vertical access,
which is access to the coastline.
133. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
134. Id at 841-42. Had the Court held that such a right existed, there would not
have been a taking. See supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text (discussing pre-
existing public rights and takings); see also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 847-48 (Brennan, I.,
dissenting) (arguing existence of pre-existing public right to refute majority holding of
a taking); infra note 169 (discussing takings).
Interestingly, no state court public trust decision has ever been struck down as a
violation of the Takings Clause. Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democ-
ratization of Western Water Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19
EnvtL L. 573,597 n.108 (1989). James Huffman submits that this is a mere truism, for
if a certain property is considered public trust property, by definition the public rights
predate any private rights in the property. James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water:
The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 EnvtL L. 527, 569 (1989).
135. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-37.
136. Id. at 842.
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is a valid exercise of a state's public trust obligations,'37 but also the
tradition of the public trust as adapted from the Roman and English
common law.' 38 Moreover, for all of the Court's discussion of valua-
ble property rights, 39 the Court failed to recognize that the Nollans
did not even assert any adverse economic impact.
Justice Brennan, in his vigorous dissent, noted that the majority
based its decision on the failure of the Commission to demonstrate a
sufficient nexus between access provisions and the burdens on access
that new development would yield.140 He stated that the majority
based its requirement for the "precise fit" regarding this nexus on the
false assumption that private landowners have reasonable expecta-
tions in their property rights upon which the public seeks to intrude. 4'
He then argued that "[t]he public's expectation of access considerably
antedates any private development on the coast""' and that "[i]t is
therefore private landowners who threaten the disruption of settled
public expectations."' 43 Thus, Justice Brennan attempted to demon-
strate a pre-existing right in the public, thereby eliminating any possi-
bility of a taking."' Justice Brennan was referring to the California
Constitution and its declaration that "[n]o individual.., shall be per-
mitted to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is re-
quired for any public purpose."' 4 5 He further announced that he
"only hope[s] that [the] decision is an aberration, and that a broader
vision ultimately prevails.' '1 46
137. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28, 30 (Ct. App.
1986); Remmenga v. California Coastal Comm'n, 209 Cal. Rptr. 628, 631 (Ct. App.),
appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 915 (1985); Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 578, 587-90 (Ct. App. 1985). In Grupe, the court upheld the state's right to
condition a development permit on landowner's assent to allow a public access ease-
ment along his property. The court stated that the landowners home "is one more
brick in the wall separating the People of California from the state's tidelands." Id. at
589.
138. See supra parts I, II.A.
139. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-32.
140. Id. at 862-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141. Id at 847 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. Id (Brennan, J., dissenting).
143. Id at 848 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. See supra notes 6, 101-12, 134, and accompanying text (discussing takings and
pre-existing public rights).
145. Cal. Const. art. X, § 4 (amended 1976).
146. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 864 (Brennan, J., dissenting). At least one commentator
agrees with Justice Brennan, stating that if he were to grade the opinions of Nollan as
a law professor, he "would give Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion an A+ and Jus-
tice Scalia, the new man on the Court, a barely passing grade." Public Access Hear-
ings, supra note 2, at 25 (statement of Dennis W. Nixon, Associate Professor of
Marine Affairs, The University of Rhode Island). Nixon continued, asserting that
"[Justice Scalia's] reading of the takings law represents a narrow reading of the law
that takes us back a hundred years." Id
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In 1994, the Supreme Court again expounded on the takings doc-
trine in Dolan v. City of Tigard' 47 In a five to four decision, 4 8 the
Court reversed the state court,149 which allowed the city of Tigard,
Oregon to force a landowner to dedicate a certain portion of her
property as a greenway and pedestrianbicycle path as a condition to
the granting of a development permit for her store.'50 The Dolan ma-
jority added another element to the takings analysis, beyond the Nol-
lan nexus15 ' requirement. Dolan required that the city prove a "rough
proportionality" between the condition and the particular harm posed
by the development. 52 The Court determined that the nexus require-
ment was met'5 3 but the "rough proportionality" requirement was
not.' 54
The Dolan Court stated that the determination of whether the
"rough proportionality," standard has been met requires "[n]o precise
mathematical calculation" but that the city must establish that the
dedication "is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the
proposed development.' 55- The city, however, merely asserted that
the creation of the pathway "'could offset some of the traffic de-
mand.' ",156 Thus, the city failed to meet its burden.'5
Furthermore, the majority distinguished several other cases by stat-
ing that they "involved essentially legislative determinations classify-
ing entire areas of the city, whereas here the city made an adjudicative
decision... on an individual parcel."' 8 Therefore, the Court noted
two distinctions that figured into their finding of a taking in Dolan:
147. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
148. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion, joined by Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Stevens' dissent was joined by Jus-
tices Blackmun and Ginsberg. Justice Souter dissented separately.
149. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2322.
150. Id. at 2313-16.
151. See supra note 135. But see supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the dissent, in which Justice Brennan attacked the majority's nexus).
152. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
153. The city's purposes for the exactions were twofold. First, limiting the develop-
ment was to prevent flooding from increased stormwater run-off. Id. at 2318-19. The
Court stated that the nexus requirement was met with respect to flood prevention
because decreasing the amount of impervious surface increases flooding. Id. at 2318.
Second, the pedestrian/bicycle path was to reduce traffic congestion by providing an
alternate transportation route. Id. The Court reasoned that the nexus requirement
was satisfied for this as well, because cycling and walking are "useful alternative
means of transportation for workers and shoppers." Id.
154. Id. at 2321-22.
155. Id. at 2319-20. For a discussion of the exact requirements of the "rough pro-
portionality" test, see Christopher J. St. Jeanos, Note, Dolan v. Tigard and the Rough
Proportionality Test: Roughly Speaking, Why Isn't A Nexus Enough?, 63 Fordham L
Rev. 1883, 1895-96 (1995).
156. Id. at 2315 (quoting City of Tigard Planning Comm'n Final Order No. 91-09
PC, App. to Pet. for Cert. G24).
157. Id at 2321.
158. Id. at 2316 (emphasis added).
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adjudicative decisionmaking and conditioning of an individual parcel.
The action proposed in this Note is very different from that in Dolan.
First, this Note proposes mainly legislative as opposed to adjudicative
action. 159 Second, the legislation will affect a very broad area of prop-
erty, even greater than an "entire area[ ] of the city." In fact, the leg-
islation proposed in this Note would effect the entire coastline of the
United States.160
Moreover, the properties involved in Dolan were not public trust
properties. The public's interest in the parcel in Dolan is hardly
comparable to the public interest in the beaches of the United States.
The city of Tigard had no pre-existing public right argument in Do-
lan's property. Such an argument is plausible regarding the beach ac-
cess issue, and the argument effectively dismantles any takings
challenge. 16 1
According to these holdings, a constitutional limit seems to exist on
state regulation with respect to trust properties. Under these condi-
tions, the takings doctrine looms as a possible shield for the private
landowner in asserting constitutional rights against the general public.
Public trust rights, however, should be construed to avoid F2roblems
with takings, given that there is a "reciprocity of advantage"' 2 and, by
definition, these rights are pre-existing public rights. Proper applica-
tion of the public trust concepts by the judiciary will make more
properties available for access to coastal resources by the public.
C. The Future Application of the Public Trust Doctrine
and Public Policy
On first inspection, the holdings in Nollan and Dolan seem to be
major setbacks for proponents of beach access. As Justice Brennan
noted, however, Nollan's precedential value may not be as potent as it
seems.' 63 He explained that the Commission could have avoided a
judicial finding of a taking by merely declaring a proper purpose in
enacting the legislation. 6 The same is true in Dolan, where poor
pleadings were at least partly responsible for the outcome. 165 Because
of the weaknesses of these decisions, including bare majorities in
both,'166 the possibility of revised pleadings changing the outcomes of
159. See infra part IV.
160. See infra part IV.
161. See supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text (discussing pre-existing rights
and takings).
162. See supra notes 113-26 and accompanying text.
163. Nollan v. California Coastal Comn'n, 483 U.S. 825, 862 (1987).
164. See id. at 862-63. Although the majority warned that disguised pleadings will
not save the legislation, id. at 841, that remains to be seen.
165. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2326 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (assailing the majority for requiring a definitive showing that the path "will" off-
set, as opposed to "could" offset, traffic congestion).
166. See supra notes 128, 148.
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the cases167 and the Nollan majority's disregard for precedent,168
other states should enact coastal development programs similar to
that of the California Coastal Commission to gain ground in the battle
for public coastal rights.
There are two main ways that states should proceed in providing
increased public beach access. First, states should follow New Jersey's
lead in providing that a reasonable portion of the dry sand area is part
of the public trust.1 69 A similar holding in all coastal states would
increase lateral access in the coastal areas significantly. Increasing lat-
eral access alone, however, would be insufficient. States must also
provide for increased vertical access to the shoreline. To allow the
public the right to traverse pathways along the beach is meaningless
without the correlative right to get to the beach.'7 0 States should im-
plement programs to increase vertical access, such as conditioning
building permits upon the allowance of a public easement. 7'
Second, states should emulate the legislation of states like Hawaii
and Texas.'" The Hawaiian legislature, recognizing the effect of the
increased population on beach access, found that the absence of pub-
lic access amounted to "an infringement upon the fundamental right
of free movement.""' Thus, the state legislature provided for the "ac-
167. See supra notes 155-56, 164, and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
169. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365-66 (NJ.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984). There is an argument that the court in Matthews effected
a taking when it appropriated the use of the "dry sand" property not traditionally
considered to be trust property to the public. As one scholar has pointed out, how-
ever, there seems to be a different view of takings when they occur by legislative
enactment rather than by judicial decree. For an insightful discussion of these "judi-
cial takings," see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 Va. L Rev. 1449
(1990).
170. See Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365. The Matthews court declared:
The bathers' right in the upland sands is not limited to passage. Reasonable
enjoyment of the foreshore and the sea cannot be realized unless some en-joyment of the dry sand area is also allowed. The complete pleasure of
swimming must be accompanied by intermittent periods of rest and relaxa-
tion beyond the waters' edge. The unavailability of the physical situs for
such rest and relaxation would seriously curtail and in many situations elimi-
nate the right to recreational use of the ocean.... [Wihere use of dry sand is
essential or reasonably necessary for enjoyment of the ocean, the [public
trust] doctrine warrants the public's use of the upland dry sand area subject
to an accommodation of the interests of the owner.
Id; see also Archer, supra note 16, at 105. Archer notes:
If the public trust doctrine is to have substance, the general public must have
reasonable access to trust lands. If the recreational demands and aesthetic
needs of modem society are to be met, it is appropriate for courts, legisla-
tures, and state government agencies to recognize this corollary to the doc-
trine and move affirmatively to preserve or create such the public right of
meaningful access.
Id
171. See supra notes 127-46 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
173. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 115-1 (1985); see supra note 9.
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quisition of land for the purchase and maintenance of public rights-of-
way and public transit corridors."'174 The Texas Open Beaches Act17-
encourages the judiciary to find public easements across coastal
properties by imposition of a presumption in favor of prescriptive
public rights.'7 6 But states must go even further in providing and pro-
tecting the public's right of access to the nation's beaches. Specific
substantive legislation must be passed that mandates access routes
over predetermined mileage intervals.'"
Strong public policy considerations favor legislation to increase
public beach access. The more affluent sector of American society
tends to dominate ownership of the beachfront property in the United
States.' 78 When wealthy landowners can exclude others from ob-
taining access to the beaches, in effect, they own the beach, the fore-
shore, and the water directly in front of their property. Many feel an
almost tangible resentment about the disparate access to the ocean
possessed by members of different socioeconomic classes. The con-
cept of the jus publicum was largely an effort to combat these senti-
mental societal upheavals and to discourage monopolization of
resources that are rightfully incapable of individual ownership. 179
Legislation of the type espoused in this Note can only provoke a gen-
erally positive societal reaction, leading not only to greater cohesive-
ness among the socioeconomic classes, but also to a sense of
community in the individual as well.'80
Reallocation of access to resources will, of course, necessitate "sac-
rifices" on the part of landowners and "bonuses" for other citizens.' 8 '
Advocates of the redistribution of natural resources have examined
174. Haw. Rev. Stat. § 115-1 (1985); see supra note 9.
175. Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 61.020 (Vernon 1978); see supra note 10.
176. See supra note 10.
177. See infra part IV. Part IV discusses federal legislation of the type urged in this
Note. States, however, should enact similar and more stringent legislation to protect
these important public rights.
178. Because the wealthy tend to dominate oceanfront areas and local politics, the
issue has long been thought of as a local land use decision or, at best, a state interest.
H.R. Rep. No. 535, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1990). Congress, however, has made it
clear that it believes beach access is of national interest and "a priority area for im-
provement." Id.
179. See supra part I.B. Professor Sax advances that the public trust concept was
partly based on the fact that "certain interests are so intrinsically important to every
citizen that their free availability tends to mark the society as one of citizens rather
than of serfs." Sax, supra note 87, at 484.
180. One court, after declaring that the public trust rights provide for certain public
uses, including recreation, stated: "'Health, recreation and sports are encompassed
in and intimately related to the general welfare of a well-balanced state.'" Matthews
v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 363 (N.J.) (quoting N.J. Sports &
Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 292 A.2d 580, 598 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971),
aff'd, 292 A.2d 545, appeal dismissed sub nom. Borough of E. Rutherford v. N.J.
Sports & Exposition Auth., 409 U.S. 943 (1972), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984)).
181. Tracy R. Lewis & Philip Neher, Consistent and Revised Plans for Natural Re-
source Use, in Essays in the Economics of Renewable Resources 55,55-56 (Leonard J.
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two general economic plans in terms of resource allocation in the
United States, though not specifically in terms of coastal access.182
These plans have interesting consequences when they are examined
against the backdrop of the beach access debate.
The first plan requires large capital expenditures and landowner
sacrifice early on for the welfare of future citizens. 18 In terms of the
beach access issue, the state and federal governments will have to ap-
propriate funds to provide access routes, and private landowners must
sacrifice portions of their properties to effectuate the goal. These
landowners, however, receive a "reciprocity of advantage," because
they too would realize increased beach access at points along the
coastline where similar exactions occurred. ' This type of plan may
be impossible to effect "if currently alive citizens generally do not em-
brace the intertemporal ethic embodied in it."ro s
The second plan seeks distribution that more closely resembles the
desires of those alive at the time. 86 If present citizens are not con-
cerned about the benefits to be bestowed on future citizens, they will
adopt a plan consistent with their own agendas, focusing on "their
own consumption and imperfectly altruistic bequest motives."'18 If
this plan is the working model of our society, reallocation of natural
resources to provide for "the common good" is, at best, an illusory
goal. This plan has been referred to as "refiect[ing] the selfishness
and myopia of people, arising from the fact of their mortality, as com-
pared with the even-handed farsightedness of an immortal state."as
Assuming that this model reflects the vision of the population of peo-
ple owning coastal properties in America, it would seem that this is
the route coastal property owners would prefer. If we consider the
broader view of "the public," however, such as the whole populace of
a given state, the former plan, requiring a present redistribution of
resource access allocation, is the more attractive. As the better model
directs, the time to act is now. The legislation proposed in this Note is
a manifestation of the first plan and would result in a tremendous in-
crease in beach access and, ultimately, greater societal cohesiveness.
Mirman & Daniel F. Spulber eds., 1982). The authors rely heavily on Frank Ramsey,
A Mathematical Theory of Saving, Econ. J., Dec. 28, 1928, at 543-59.
182. See Lewis & Neher, supra note 181, at 56.
183. Id
184. See supra notes 113-26 and accompanying text.
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IIl. CONSEQUENCES OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCrMINE AS A
COMMON LAW TRUST PRINCIPLE
Much discussion has been focused on the issue of how to classify the
public trust doctrine in American law.189 Classification is important in
determining how the doctrine is applied."9 Judges and researchers
haveclassified the public trust as part of federal constitutional law,19'
state constitutional law,19 property law,193 and as a means of judicial
review of administrative action.' 94 Several of these classifications
have merit, but each also has profound weaknesses. 95 The best way
189. A detailed analysis of these classifications is beyond the scope of this Note.
For an interesting, if not accurate, analysis, see Huffman, supra note 134, at 534-68.
Huffmnan argues that the public trust is a property concept and should be treated as
such. Id. at 533-34. Huffman undermines his own analysis, however, by his admission
that his concern that the public trust be treated as an aspect of property law "is based
largely on the belief that if the doctrine is thus classified, courts will be more likely to
be active in the defense of private rights in property." Id. at 534. While Huffnan's
intentions may be considered honorable (from the landowners' perspective), he falls
into the logical trap of discovering the conclusions he seeks to reach prior to defining
the premises. Interestingly, in the same article, Huffman attacks a proponent of pub-
lic rights by stating that the colleague "is blinded by his own 'agenda.'" Id. at 568.
190. See Huffman, supra note 134, at 529.
191. See Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts
on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 Envtl. L. 425, 464 (1989)
(stating that the public trust is best understood as a "federal mandate" embodied in
the Constitution).
192. See CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1120 (Alaska 1988) (invali-
dating state tideland conveyance because it violated the public trust doctrine as em-
bodied in state constitution); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran,
682 P.2d 163, 170-71 (Mont. 1984) (relying on state constitution to assert that public
trust allowed the public to use waters that flowed through landowners property);
United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247
N.W.2d 457, 461 (N.D. 1976) (finding that plaintiff stated a valid cause of action based
on the public trust doctrine embodied in state constitution); see also Blumm, supra
note 134, at 574,577-78 (maintaining that the public trust doctrine is often regarded as
having a state constitutional basis in the law).
193. See Huffman, supra note 134, at 561-65.
194. See W. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law: Air and Water § 2.20, at 162 (1986?;
Blumm, supra note 134, at 589-95. Blumm discusses the manifestation of the publc
trust as the "hard look" doctrine, which basically calls for full disclosure in adminis-
trative decision making. Treating the doctrine as such would require agencies to re-
veal explanations for decisions, explanations for following different procedures in
similar cases, and would further require the agency to demonstrate that they have
considered alternatives. Id. at 589-90. Blumm states that this "hard look" results in
fairness in process and reasoned decision making, rather than any substantive conse-
quences. Id. at 590.
195. For example, if the public trust is viewed as a federal constitutional right, the
argument is that these rights predate private ownership rights and are, therefore, le-
gitimized. See supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text (discussing pre-existing pub-
lic rights). Such rights, however, are not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, so
proponents of this view must argue that these rights are implied. The very existence of
rights that are not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution is a hotly debated topic.
Compare Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the
Law (1990) (arguing for strict interpretation of the Constitution and finding no rights
not explicitly mentioned) and Robert H. Bork, Original Intent: The Only Legitimate
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to analyze the public trust doctrine is under trust law,196 as the term
"public trust" explicitly, if not intentionally, directs.
A. Classifying the Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust has many traits that are similar to modem trusts in
America. Thus, the public trust can, and should, be examined in light
of modem trust law. 197 "A trust... is a fiduciary relationship with
respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to the
property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the
benefit of another person, which arises as a result of a manifestation
of intention to create it."'198 The principal concept underlying modem
trust law is that legal and equitable title to property can be
separated. 99
Modern trust law requires the presence of three main elements,200
all of which are present in the public trust. First, a trustee, the individ-
ual or group that owns the legal title, is necessary.201 In the context of
the public trust, the state is the trustee.202 Second, at least one benefi-
ciary,203 or cestui que trust,2°4 who holds the equitable title is re-
quired.205 The beneficiaries of the public trust are the members of the
Basis for Constitutional Decision Making, Judge's J., Summer 1987, at 12, 13 (same)
with Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804-08, 2810-11 (1992) (discuss-
ing rights implicit in the text of the Constitution) and Paul Brest, The Fundamental
Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradiction of Normative Constitutional Scholar-
ship, 90 Yale LU. 1063 (1981) (arguing against a strict interpretation of the
Constitution).
196. Many courts, including the Supreme Court, have analyzed the doctrine accord-
ing to modem trust principles. See Cinque Bambini Partnership v. State, 491 So. 2d
508, 511 (Miss. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi. 484 U.S.
469 (1988); Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 581 P.2d 520 (Or. Ct. App. 1978),
aff'd, 590 P.2d 709 (Or. 1979).
197. See e.g., Archer, supra note 16, at 31 n.64 ("[N]o conceptual difficulty arises in
applying trust principles in the public trust context."). But see Huffman, supra note
134, at 534-45. Huffman argues that the public trust is a property concept. See supra
note 189. Even Huffnan, however, a strong opponent of viewing the public trust as
part of trust law, concedes that "the doctrine may have had legitimate claim to a
comer of the law of trusts at the time of its birth." Id at 533.
198. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 (1959).
199. Id § 2 cmt. f
200. Id. § 2 cmt. h. One or more of these elements may be absent temporarily
without destroying the trust. Id
201. Id. § 2 cmt. L
202. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,452 (1892); supra text accompany-
ing notes 80-81.
203. A beneficiary is "[o]ne who benefits from act of another. A party who will
benefit from a transfer of property or other arrangement." Black's Law Dictionary
157 (6th ed. 1990).
204. A cestui que trust is "[hie who has a right to a beneficial interest in and out of
an estate the legal title to which is vested in another.... The beneficiary of a trust."
Black's Law Dictionary 229 (6th ed. 1990).
205. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 cmt. j (1959).
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public.206 Note that both the trustee (or trustees) and the beneficiary
(or beneficiaries) "own" the trust property.2 °7 This notion of dual
ownership is essential to the trust concept. 208 Third, the modem trust
requires trust property, °9 which, in the public trust context means, at
the very least, navigable waterways.210
Generally, the settlor211 creates a trust because she does not have
confidence that the beneficiary will use the property wisely, or be-
cause the beneficiary is a minor, or otherwise incapacitated and is thus
unable to manage the property herself.212 The trust purposes are to
be identified in the intentions of the settlor.21 3 In the case of the pub-
lic trust, the determination as to who is the settlor is controversial. 14
Commentators may propose that the settlor is God, natural law, 15 the
states themselves,216 or the federal government. The reason for deter-
mining the settlor is largely to understand the purposes for which the
trust was established.217
206. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452; supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
207. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 cmt. f (1959).
208. Id. § 2 cmt. f.
209. Id § 2 cmt. k.
210. In England, the public trust doctrine only applied to navigable waterways. See
Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367,411 (1842); New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land
Co., 64 P. 735, 739 (1901); Ruberto, supra note 2, at 374-75 & n.116, In America, the
definition of trust property is largely controlled by state statutory and/or case law. In
1810, a Pennsylvania court expanded the traditional English public trust doctrine to
include waters regardless of navigability. Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 474, 477 (Pa. 1810).
The Supreme Court held that the public trust doctrine applied to non-navigable wa-
ters that were subject to tidal influence. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484
U.S. 469, 484-85 (1988); supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text. Some states, such
as New Jersey, include within the definition of public trust properties a "reasonable"
portion of the foreshore and the dry sand area. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improve-
ment Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
211. The creator of a trust is called the settlor. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 3.1
(1959). The terminology differs with respect to the creator depending on the type of
trust that is created. The term settlor is comprehensive and therefore can be used
when the creator makes an intervivos trust or makes a testamentary trust (a trust
created by will). The term "testator" is used to refer to the creator of a testamentary
trust. For our purposes, the term "settlor" will be used.
Note that the three parties mentioned do not have to be different individuals in all
cases. For example, the creator and the trustee may be the same person. Trust law,
however, does impose some limitations on the parties. For instance, a single person
or entity cannot be both sole trustee and sole beneficiary. Id. § 115(5). Such a trust
would be unenforceable, because a person may not sue himself.
212. See George T. Bogert, Trusts 7 (6th ed. 1987).
213. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 4 & cmt. a (1959). Note that a settlor may
create a trust by conduct as well as by words. Id. § 24.1.
214. This discussion is beyond the scope of this Note and will not be examined in
detail.
215. See supra text accompanying note 27. For an interesting analysis of the place
of natural law in the Constitution, see Russell Kirk, Natural Law and the Constitution
of the United States, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1035 (1994).
216. See Archer, supra note 16, at 31 n.64.
217. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 268 & cmt. a (1969).
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There are three main types of trusts."' The determination of which
type of trust the public trust falls into, like the identification of the
settlor, is done to understand the purpose of the trust so that courts
can apply its terms according to the original intent of the trust. Thus,
for purposes of this Note, the questions of to whom to attribute the
creation of the public trust and to which classification of trust it be-
longs are of no major importance. The purpose of both determina-
tions is to discern the intentions of the settlor. The purpose of the
trust is of utmost importance because, under trust law, a trustee has a
fiduciary obligation to the beneficiaries to manage the property in fur-
therance of the trust purposes.2 19 But no matter who we consider the
settlor to be, or how we categorize the trust, the intention of the pub-
lic trust remains the same-the public's reasonable access and use of
public trust properties.
Under modern trust law, when there is a breach of fiduciary duty on
the part of a trustee, the trustee can be removed by the courts. °20 Ad-
ditionally, anyone who stands to benefit from the trust can compel
218. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 1 cmts. d, e (1959). The first of the three
types of trusts is the express trust. The creator of an express trust explicitly details the
permitted uses of the trust property. I& § 1 cmt. e. One could argue that, if we as-
sume that the creator of the trust is natural law, then there is (in a sense) an express
intention for the public to have use of trust properties. This reasoning is not persua-
sive and the public trust is probably not properly viewed as an express trust. See
Huffman, supra note 134, at 536 (noting that an express trust requires a manifestation
of intent and arguing that "[n]o such manifestation exists in the public trust
doctrine").
Secondly, there is the constructive trust A constructive trust is one in which -ac-
quisition or retention of the property is wrongful [or] ... the [title holder] ... would
be unjustly enriched if... permitted to retain the property." Restatement (Second) of
Trusts § 1 cmt. e (1959). Again, assuming the creator to be natural law, the argument
could be made that the intention was that the trust property be shared by all members
of the public. Thus, if the legal title holder could exclude the public from these
properties, she, being a wrongdoer, would be unjustly enriched.
Perhaps the strongest argument for classification, however, is within the third cate-
gory, the resulting trust. A resulting trust arises where a disposition of property has
been made, but the facts and circumstances of the disposition suggest that the creator
did not intend for the legal title holder to have the beneficial use of the property also.
Id. § 404. Thus, the argument is that when public trust properties were transferred
into private hands, the intention was that the beneficial interest would be held for the
public. See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 134, at 537 ("If the public trust doctrine is prop-
erly a part of the law of trusts, it necessarily falls within the category of resulting
trust.").
219. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 cmt. b (1959).
220. Id. § 107 cmt. a; see Riegler v. Riegler, 553 S.W.2d 37,41 (Ark. 1977) (uphold-
ing decree ordering removal of a trustee who had violated his duty); Brown v. Brown,
436 N.E.2d 877, 884-86 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (listing appropriate grounds for removal
of trustee); Wolosoff v. CSI Liquidating Trust, 500 A.2d 1076, 1082 (NJ. Super. Ct.
App. Div.1985) (noting that trustee can be removed within the sound discretion of the
court); Robinson v. Kirbie, 793 P.2d 315, 318 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that
trustee may be removed for cause); Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Ctr. v.
Holman, 732 P.2d 974, 987 (Wash. 1987) (noting that bad will due to litigation is suffi-
cient cause for removal of trustee); Waits v. Hamlin, 776 P.2d 1003, 1007-08 (Wash.
Ct. App.1989) (stating that bad will is appropriate grounds for trustee removal).
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removal of the trustee for cause by application to the court with juris-
diction."' Moreover, under modem trust principles, a beneficiary can
call for an accounting of trust assets at reasonable intervals to deter-
mine how they are being managed by the trustee."z This action can
be used as evidence by the beneficiary to prove breach of fiduciary
duty. If the breach is serious enough, the accounting could lead a
court to remove the trustee and to appoint a new trustee.2 3
B. The Public Trust as a True Trust
Once the public trust doctrine is accepted as a true trust, propo-
nents of public beach access have a new weapon in their arsenal with
which to attack the increasing privatization of America's coastline.2 4
The original purpose of the public trust doctrine, in the most restric-
tive sense, 2 5 was to protect fishing, navigation, and commerce. 22 6 In
the American derivation of the ancient Roman idea, however, many
courts have extended the doctrine227 to provide for easements for
public access to the foreshore and even the dry sand area.28 The pub-
lic trust analyzed as a true trust allows for two different, though sub-
stantially overlapping, approaches to increasing public beach access.
First, proponents of public access rights, through the analogy to the
modem trust, could call for an accounting of trust properties by the
state.22 9 This accounting would be a useful tool for the public regard-
ing public trust properties. As beneficiaries, the public could force the
221. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 107 cmt. i (1959).
222. Id. § 173.
223. A new trustee can be appointed by the court with proper jurisdiction. See id.§ 108(a).
224. Other methods that have been utilized, though with mixed results, are pre-
scription, implied dedication, and custom. For an analysis of these methods, see Car-
michael, supra note 2, at 159.
225. The term "restrictive sense" refers to the presumption that the creator is the
federal government or the state, rather than God or natural law. The assumption is
that if we accept that God or natural law is the creator, the rights intended to be
public would be more expansive than those intended by the federal or state
government.
226. Shively v. Bowiby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894).
227. See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (noting that public trust
easements "include the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, [and] use for boating and
general recreation purposes the navigable waters of the state"); Borough of Neptune
City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972) ("The public rights
in tidal lands are not limited to the ancient prerogatives of navigation and fishing, but
extend as well to recreational uses, including bathing, swimming and other shore ac-
tivities."); Hixon v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 146 N.W.2d 577, 582 (Wis. 1966) (recogniz-
ing that public uses include recreation (citing State v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 81
N.W.2d 71, 74 (Wis. 1957))); see also Frank E. Maloney et al., Public Beach Access: A
Guaranteed Place to Spread Your Towel, 29 U. Fla. L. Rev. 853, 860-62 (1977) (noting
the trend toward increasing allowance of recreational activities along the foreshore
under the doctrine).
228. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
229. See supra text accompanying note 222.
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trustee to make a full disclosure regarding the condition of the trust
properties' 0 Generally, courts have upheld public trust rights to sue
governmental and private parties to vindicate public interests in prop-
erty133 Information as to the condition of the trust properties could
be used as evidence to prove a continuous breach of fiduciary duty on
the part of the state." 2 Establishing such a breach could lead to the
removal of the state as the trustee.
Second, application of the modem trust concept of fiduciary duty
allows for the removal of the state as trustee of public trust properties.
It is well settled that all trustees owe a fiduciary duty to the benefi-
ciaries of the trust13~3 Many states presently breach this fiduciary duty
by failing to provide adequate access to public trust properties. Appli-
cation of modem trust concepts to the public trust allows any member
of the public to bring an action against the state for denying her rea-
sonable access to public trust properties.234 Proponents of increased
beach access should target states that have not been responsive to
public desire to obtain increased beach access for removal as trustees.
No Supreme Court decisions bar the removal of states as trustees of
public trust properties. The question, however, has never been ad-
dressed. The public trust is largely misunderstood. Professor Joseph
Sax states that, in reviewing reported cases, there exist several mis-
leading comments to the effect that a government may never convey
or alienate trust properties to a private owner.235 Professor Sax re-
futes these findings:
[T]here is no general prohibition against the disposition of trust
properties, even on a large scale. A state may, for example, recog-
nize private ownership in tidelands and submerged lands below the
high water mark; indeed, some states have done so and have re-
230. This correlates with Blumm's "hard look" doctrine, supra note 194.
231. See, e.g., Maryland Dep't of Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F.
Supp. 1060, 1066-67 (D. Md. 1972) (upholding state's power to sue oil company based
on public trust rights for leak that damaged local harbor); New Jersey Dep't of EnvtL
Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 308 A.2d 671, 673 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1973) (allowing state agency to sue atomic power plant based on public trust
rights when the plant released heated water into a canal killing approximately 500,000
fish).
232. See supra note 194.
233. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2 cmt. b (1959). In important public prop-
erty rights decisions, the Supreme Court determined that states are impressed with a
fiduciary duty with respect to managing trust properties for the benefit of the public.
Shively v. Bowby, 152 U.S. 1, 43 (1894); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367,413
(1842); see also Waters and Water Rights §§ 30.01(c), 30.02(c) (Robert F_ Beck ed.,
1991) (discussing the fiduciary obligations of states regarding public trust properties).
234. It has been suggested that the trust obligation can be enforced by any citizen
of the United States. See Mallon v. City of Long Beach, 282 P.2d 481,490 (Cal. 1955)
(Spence, J., dissenting) (stating that California is the trustee for the public trust
properties and that "the beneficiaries of such trust were not alone the people of this
state but all the people of the United States. Thus, it has been indicated that the
federal government could enforce such trust.")
235. Sax, supra note 87, at 485.
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ceived judicial approval.... [C]ourts have held that since the state
has an obligation as trustee which it may not lawfully divest,
whatever title the grantee has taken is impressed with the public
trust and must be read in conformity with it.23 6
Therefore, states may transfer trust properties to individuals as long as
the properties are maintained in such a way that the management in-
creases public use or, at least, does not interfere with the public rights
in the property.2 37 Thus, the notion that the public trust cannot be
transferred to another trustee because states cannot transfer trust
properties is erroneous. Following Sax's logic, the removal of states
as trustees and the insertion of another trustee would transfer the ob-
ligations to the new trustee.2 38
Upon removal of the state as trustee, the question then becomes:
To whom do we entrust the powers of trustee? This question has
never been addressed and is difficult to answer. The new trustee
would acquire legal title and management of the trust property, as the
state previously had. 39
One possible solution is to allow the federal government to super-
vise and temporarily manage these properties so as to provide for con-
tinued reasonable access to the public. The federal government could
then convey these equitable interests to municipalities or individuals,
subject to the same fiduciary duties as a trustee in any other trust situ-
ation.24 ° These individuals or municipalities would receive federal
funds24 ' to purchase easement rights from private landowners at inter-
vals along the coastline. 42 The funds received would be in excess of
the costs of acquiring these easements. This will provide sufficient fi-
nancial incentive for the municipality or individual to maintain an in-
terest in increasing beach access.
236. Il at 486-87 (citations omitted).
237. See Archer, supra note 16, at 56-60.
238. While the Illinois Central decision stated that states cannot abrogate public
trust rights, the Court did not address whether the states could forcibly be removed as
trustees for violating their fiduciary duties. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying
text (discussing Illinois Central). Thus, the decision has no bearing on the issue of
forcible removal.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 201-02.
240. The concept of a private owner was espoused in the 1800s by so-called laissez-
faire theorists. See Drayton, supra note 26, at 769, 772 n.43. This movement, however,
called for the trust properties to be turned over to private individuals, free of the trust
obligations. I& at 769, 772. Rather than have the trust situation, the lands were to be
subject to easement rights in the public. Id. at 772 n.43. As one commentator main-
tained: "Although, given the subsequent advent of democratic government, this early
Liberal bias is no longer a necessary block to government trustee ownership, social
policy against overcentralization continues to argue for a similar result." Id. at 770.
241. See infra part IV.
242. It is important to note here that municipalities and individuals with public du-
ties may be able to exercise the power of eminent domain. See infra note 247 (provid-
ing a definition of eminent domain).
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Arguably, giving the property to the federal government to manage
would violate the public's rights because the federal government is not
as directly accountable to the citizens of each state as are individual
state governments. The federal government, however, would only
manage the public trust properties temporarily; the properties would
then be conveyed to municipalities or individuals. The municipalities
would be directly accountable to the public, and individuals, given the
proper financial incentives, would also strive to manage the trust
properties properly.243 Another option is that the federal government
could convey the property to an office headed by an elected official,
who would also be directly accountable to the public.
Of course, states could avoid problems with the public trust doc-
trine by enacting legislation that sufficiently protects public rights in
oceanfront properties. While many states have already implemented
programs that attempt to deal effectively with the problem,' all
states need to develop better ways to accomplish the goal of greater
beach access. And while the Supreme Court's holdings in Nollan 45
and Dolan2" make it more difficult for states to provide access, it is
still possible for states to respond favorably to public desire for beach
access.
Another option for states to avoid removal as trustees of trust
properties is to administer plans such as attaching easement rights to
construction permits. States also may use their eminent domain pow-
ers2 4 7 to purchase these properties to allow for greater beach access.248
Failure to use police powers is, in some circumstances, a breach of
fiduciary duty in areas where there is insufficient beach access. The
states are not acting in the best interests of the public regarding public
trust properties. They must begin now to provide reasonable access to
243. These municipalities or individuals would be reimbursed for their reasonable
expenses pursuant to their duties and would also receive compensation for effectively
discharging their obligations as trustees.
244. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 127-36 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 137-46,
163-68, and accompanying text (discussing the weaknesses of the Nollan decision).
246. See supra notes 147-58 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 165-68 and
accompanying text (discussing the weaknesses of the Dolan decision).
247. Eminent domain is defined as "[t]he power to take private property for public
use by the state, municipalities, and private persons or corporations authorized to
exercise functions of public character." Black's Law Dictionary 523 (6th ed. 1990).
248. Indeed, the Supreme Court declared that states are free to purchase easement
rights. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841-42 (1987). Further,
the federal Coastal Zone Management Act even provides states with funds to accom-
plish augmentation in beach access routes. See 16 U.S.C. § 1455(d)(10)(B) (Supp. V
1993); see also infra part IV (discussing the Coastal Zone Management Act). States
should also implement their own programs to purchase rights-of-way above and be-
yond the federal legislation. Hawaiian law, for example, calls for purchase of public




the shore for the public. If they do not, a change in the trustee could
well be the solution to the beach access problem in the United States.
IV. FEDERAL GUIDELINES
The only significant federal legislation in the area of public beach
access is the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 ("CZMA"). 9
The CZMA makes funds available for states to develop comprehen-
sive coastal management programs, including plans for increased pub-
lic access to coastal areas.5S When the statute was passed, many
proponents of greater beach access rights were elated because it was
the first Congressional declaration of a federal interest in what were,
prior to the enactment, regarded as "local" land use decisions. 251
Since its enactment, proponents of the CZMA have been fighting
for its survival. The CZMA has been plagued by problems concerning
"[i]nadequate and sometimes nonexistent funding, case by case deci-
sionmaking, state/federal conflicts, uncoordinated planning, pressure
for development and energy, insufficient research information, splin-
tered federal authority, and restrictive court decisions. ' ' -2 Addition-
ally, the CZMA has been unable to clear its budget through the
Senate Appropriations Committee. For example, in 1987, the man-
agement budget was cut from forty to five million dollars.253
In 1990, Congress amended the CZMA to provide greater incen-
tives for state planning.254 From 1974 to 1985, federal grants pursuant
to the CZMA had reached approximately $187 million.255 The 1990
amendments augmented the appropriations for 1991 through 1995.256
Nevertheless, the amendments have been the subject of attack, be-
249. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
250. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1455(d)(10)(B), 1461(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The Act sets up
a matching grant assistance program with a four to one ratio of federal to state contn-
butions. 16 U.S.C. § 1454(a) (Supp. V 1993). The Act is administered by the Secre-
tary of Commerce, with delegated authority to the Under Secretary for Oceans and
Atmosphere at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. H.R. Rep.
No. 535, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1990). At present, at least 29 of the 35 eligible states
and territories have received federal approval for their coastal management pro-
grams. ld.
251. Linda A. Malone, The Coastal Zone Management Act and the Takings Clause
in the 1990's: Making the Case for Federal Land Use to Preserve Coastal Areas, 62 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 711, 711 (1991).
252. 1d at 714 (footnote omitted).
253. Coastal Zone Management: Hearing Before the Nat'l Ocean Policy Study of the
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp. of the Senate, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 44
(1987).
254. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (Supp. V 1993).
255. Malone, supra note 251, at 720.
256. 16 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (Supp. V 1993). The statute segregates the appropriations
for the components of the Act differently in the 1990 amendments. The total appro-
priations under the Act for the 1991 fiscal year are $54.2 million and rise to $64.4
million in 1995. H.R. Rep. No. 535, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990).
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cause, while purporting to strengthen the CZMA,25' Congress again
has refused to include detailed substantive state land use
requirements.25 8
Among the stated goals of the Coastal Zone Management Act is the
objective of "[a]ttaining increased opportunities for public access...
to coastal areas of recreational, historical, aesthetic, ecological, or cul-
tural value." 259 The accomplishment of this goal requires more than a
mere declaration of a federal objective and authorization of an appro-
priation that is subject to massive cuts by the Senate.2 '° The federal
government must provide more incentives to the states for them to
respond adequately. The impetus for the states' cooperation should
be in the form of a spending program over and above what the CZMA
authorizes. Due to the increasing population in the United States,26
and the trend toward higher population density at the coastline, 2
more money must be spent on coastal access at present and in the
future.2 63
As a constitutional matter, the federal government has the power to
institute such a spending program pursuant to the Spending Clause of
the United States Constitution, '  which states in pertinent part:
"Congress shall have Power to... provide for the.., general Welfare
of the United States."265 Congress has the power to condition federal
grants upon compliance with federal objectives.2 66 This federal spend-
ing power has been interpreted broadly as extending beyond "the di-
257. According to the House conference report, the purpose was to "improve state
management programs." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 964, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 969 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2374, 2674.
258. Malone, supra note 251, at 771.
259. 16 U.S.C. § 1456b(a)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
260. See supra text accompanying note 253.
261. See Miguel A. Santos, Managing Planet Earth 18 (1990). Santos notes that the
United States population is growing by approximately two to three million people per
year. Id. For an industrial country, the United States has one of the fastest growth
rates. Id. From 1990 until the end of the 20th century, the population has been pro-
jected to increase between 32 and 36 million people. Id. Santos further states that this
escalation in population will increase strain on the distribution of natural resources.
Id. at 20.
262. See supra note 2.
263. It has been suggested that the National Park Service and the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service become more active in preserving public coastal areas. Pub-
lic Access Hearings, supra note 2, at 6 (statement of Governor Edward D. DiPrete of
the State of Rhode Island).
264. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
265. Id.
266. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 474 (1980); see also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974) (declaring that
the federal government may "fix the terms on which its money allotments... shall be
disbursed"); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958) (stating
that the federal government's power "to impose reasonable conditions on the use of
federal funds" is beyond challenge); Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n,
330 U.S. 127, 144 (1947) ("The offer of benefits to a state by the United States depen-
dent upon cooperation by the state with federal plans... is not unusual.").
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rect grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.""26
Therefore, the fact that the objective of greater beach access is not
within one of the "enumerated legislative fields"2 6 is irrelevant. Con-
gress is free to condition federal grants on states' increasing beach
access to their citizens.269 Thus, the federal government is free to pur-
sue this stated objective by means of its spending power.
The spending power, however, is limited in scope.27 ° The language
of the Spending Clause requires that the spending program be for "the
general welfare." '271 Indubitably, spending for better public beach ac-
cess is for the public's welfare.2 72 On the issue of whether spending is
intended to promote public purposes, "courts should defer substan-
tially to the judgment of Congress."273 Furthermore, the condition for
the grant of funds must be clear, affording the states the opportunity
to "exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of
their participation."274 But due to its lack of substantive guidance and
inventiveness, inefficient implementation, and limited financial sup-
port, the CZMA clearly is not sufficient to prevent and eliminate the
privatization of the American coastline.
This Note proposes comprehensive federal legislation requiring
states to increase coastal access and prevent further privatization of
the coastline. Although this is one of the stated goals of the CZMA,
its effect is diminished because it is stated among several other
goals.275 The legislation proposed here has a single goal-to provide
the public with greater coastal access in every coastal state. The legis-
lation should assist courts in determining whether there has been a
breach of fiduciary duty by the states.276 It should provide clear sub-
267. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936).
268. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
269. See Butler, 297 U.S. at 65.
270. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
271. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937)
and United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)).
272. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 363 (N.J.) ("Ex-
tension of the public trust doctrine to include bathing, swimming and other shore
activities is consonant with and furthers the general welfare."), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
821 (1984).
273. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640, 645 (1937)).
The Dole Court stated that the degree of deference to which Congress is entitled in
this determination "is such that the Court has more recently questioned whether 'gen-
eral welfare' is a judicially enforceable restriction at all." Id. at 207 n.2.
274. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
275. 16 U.S.C. § 1452 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
276. As one researcher interested in the quality of coastal resources and increased
beach access has observed:
It is unrealistic to expect that coastal zones will be protected adequately as
an interrelated ecosystem without substantive, minimum federal standards
.... When preservation of a critical environmental ecosystem is at stake,
there is a need for federal intervention that transcends state and local pre-
rogatives, because the parties affected by the decisionmaking (and thus the
forum in which those decisions should be made) are no longer limited to
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stantive guidance to states to effectuate the goal. The legislation must,
above all, require states to ?rovide at least one access route directly to
the ocean every ten miles, I along all coastlines. Of course, excep-
tions would be allowed on a case by case basis. 78 Further, it should
require that states extend the traditional doctrine's application to en-
compass a portion of the dry sand area along the coastline.279 Such
legislation would simplify the judicial determination of whether there
has been a breach of fiduciary duty by the state.
This mileage requirement will not be unduly burdensome for the
states because methods exist to assist states in obtaining these proper-
ties. The proposed federal legislation should describe these methods
and encourage state courts to presume that the states have acted prop-
erly in acquiring the properties. The first method, and the least costly,
is to support judicial findings of pre-existing public rights in coastal
properties. In many states, the state constitutions and statutes provide
for public rights in the ocean. 280 In many cases, these constitutions
and statutes predate private ownership. Thus, as Justice Brennan as-
serted in his dissent in Nollan, the public's rights must be enforced
judicially because they existed before the private landowners'
rights.8 When pre-existing rights exist in the public, there can be no
legitimate claim of a taking,' and no compensation is owed.
Furthermore, state legislation could allow the states to acquire
coastal properties free of charge. Texas has enacted legislation of this
type by adopting a prima facie presumption in favor of public rights,
encouraging courts to find prescriptive easements across "private"
those persons living in the immediate vicinity of the resource. In that sense,
controlling development that will impair the environmental values of coastal
resources is better characterized as 'environmental regulation' to be ad-
dressed at the federal level than 'land use' regulation reserved to state and
local governments.
Malone, supra note 251, at 772.
277. This calculation is based on the idea that the furthest distance anyone would
have to travel laterally to a beach access route is five miles. Conceivably, an individ-
ual without transportation could walk such a distance.
278. For example, a court could sustain an exception if the terrain is dangerous,
such as a steep decline toward the ocean. See, e.g., Haw. Rev. Stat. § 115-3 (1985)
(stating that accessways should be at "reasonable intervals taking into consideration
the topography and physical characteristics of the land").
279. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (discussing the New Jersey
Supreme Court's response to diminishing beach access).
280. See supra note 21.
281. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 847-48 (1987) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
282. See supra notes 6, 169, and accompanying text; supra part II.B. The argument
of adverse possession by a landowner cannot be sustained, because most states pro-
vide that state land and, more specifically, trust lands cannot be lost through adverse
possession. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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properties.283 Thus, the states may acquire these properties without
compensating the "owners."
The next facet of the legislation should direct states to use their
power of eminent domain.281 This power allows the state to acquire
private property for the public benefit by paying just compensation. 28s
For states in compliance with federal standards under the CZMA,
funds are available for this purpose. Although coastal properties are
expensive, the longer that states wait to enforce this requirement, the
more expensive implementation of the legislation will be, because of
continuing appreciation in the properties' value.
If any beneficiary 6 could establish that a trustee failed to meet the
minimum federal standard under the statute, the court should require
that the state either provide an access route or face removal as trustee
of the property. Because the removal of states as trustees would re-
quire the forfeiture of these federal funds, 7 the states would not will-
ingly give up the trustee position. To retain the position, a state
would, in effect, be forced to provide what citizens should already
have-"reasonable" beach access.
The argument might be made that requiring rights-of-way through
private property is a taking of private property for public use and that
the land owner must therefore be compensated.8 8 But states may re-
quire reasonable pathways, both lateral and vertical,289 as conditions
on coastal building permits without compensating the landowner.290
Of course, the condition must satisfy the Nollan "nexus" test291 and
the Dolan "rough proportionality" test,2 g which are by no means
insurmountable.293
Further, there is the strong argument that the public trust rights are
pre-existing rights.294 If so, there can be no legitimate claim of a tak-
ing. 95 In addition, the Supreme Court has stated that there are no
restrictions regarding state enforcement of pre-existing rights.296
283. Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 61.020 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1995); see supra note
10 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 247 (providing a definition of eminent domain).
285. See supra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
286. In this context, the category of beneficiaries probably includes all United
States citizens. See supra note 234. At the very least, the beneficiaries include all state
citizens.
287. If the state is removed as trustee, the new trustee would receive these stipends.
288. See supra note 6 and accompanying text and part II.B.
289. See supra note 132.
290. See Fmnell, supra note 123, at 677-78; Public Access Hearings, supra note 2, at
15 (statement of William Travis, Deputy Director of the San Francisco Bay Conserva-
tion and Development Commission, State of California); supra part II.B.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 135, 140.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 152, 155.
293. See supra notes 140-46, 163-68, and accompanying text.
294. See supra part II.B.
295. See supra notes 101-04, 134, and accompanying text.
296. See supra text accompanying note 104.
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But even if a court determined that it would be a taking to allow for
easement rights across private properties, the individual or municipali-
ties, or even the state, as trustee committed to its fiduciary duty, must
purchase rights-of-way to allow for reasonable public beach access. "7
CONCLUSION
Increased development along the shorelines of the United States
threatens the access of the public to one of our nation's most trea-
sured natural resources, the ocean. Disparities in socioeconomic posi-
tion are leading to significant deviation in terms of access to the
nation's common resources.2 98 The United States must look beyond
protection of acknowledged and existing access routes toward the re-
alization of ancient public rights in accessing the ocean.
The public trust doctrine is firmly embedded in Anglo-American
jurisprudence, as adapted from ancient Roman ideals. These rights
are pre-existing rights and are, therefore, takings-proof. It is time for
the legislature and the courts to recognize the doctrine's utility in solv-
ing modem problems, especially in terms of beach access in the
United States. As the New Jersey Supreme Court declared, "The
public trust doctrine, like all common law principles, should not be
considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to meet
changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to
benefit." 99
When states are presented with the option of providing reasonable
rights of way, or being removed as trustees of public trust properties
and forfeiting federal stipends, states may begin to provide reasonable
access. If not, the states should be removed as trustees. Withouz such
a threat or incentive, many states will not act in the best interests of
the public regarding public beach access.
297. Recall that municipalities and even individuals, in some circumstances, have
the power of eminent domain. See supra note 247 (providing a definition of eminent
domain).
298. See supra part II.C.
299. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54
(NJ. 1972).
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